National Security, Current and Historical Events

Due to current events, I've been rethinking how I was going to write my next few posts.  It seems that (much though I was planning to avoid it) I actually have to write about some of my  underlying thought processes. 

Take the current situation with Russa, regarding Syria and the US elections.  There are some Americans arguing that we need to be firm, that Russia sees anything less as a sign of weakness and will keep pushing unless or until we do stand firm.  Others see the potential for the situation to escalate out of hand, and do not think we should risk starting World War III over Syria.

Historically, there's merit to both arguments.  For a while there, some Americans thought Saddam Hussein misinterpreted a discussion with our State Dept as an indication that the US would do nothing if he invaded Kuwait.  (Reading up on it now, clearly more information has developed since I heard about this in college...and it looks like this isn't actually what happened.)

On the flip side, historians say that Germany helped create the conditions for World War I because they had lost almost all their allies except Austria, and so had to demonstrate their firm commitment to their ally...which helped expand what could have been a much more local conflict into something global. (Otto van Bismarck allegedly believed that Germany was at risk of encirclement, and worked hard to maintain good relations with his neighbors.  Kaiser Wilhelm wasn't quite so adept at foreign policy, and managed to alienate almost everyone.) 

Given the articles I posted a couple of days ago, I decided to check around a bit online.  One article said that Russia had to support Assad, because if Assad is overthrown then Iran is the only ally they have left in the region.

What's funny is that this article is discussing the decline of Russian influence (and paints the support for Assad as a sign of that weakness, much like Germany supporting Austria), whereas a lot of other articles are basically saying that Russia is standing strong and making the United States look weak and ineffective.

I don't know enough about the situation to say what's truly going on, unfortunately.  It seems like there are two (or more) ways of analyzing the situation, and the recommended course of action for one scenario is the absolutely worst thing you could do if the second is closer to reality.  And vice versa.

Anyways.  The point of this post was to say I'm changing up what I was going to write about.  I planned to discuss our relationship with Iran - I don't think anyone can say that our policies towards Iran have made  us more secure over the past thirty or forty decades.  Our involvement with the Iranian coup in 1953 was a factor in our hostile relations since the revolution.  What's funny is that according to Wilsonian ideals we should never have done gotten involved like that. 

Were the American individuals who supported the coup the realists?  Or should they have expected and predicted the backlash we received?  After all, we were once a colony ourselves.  We fought our own revolution against imperial rule.  If any great nation should have understood how resentful a nation can be when outside powers appear to be in control, it was the United States. 

(What's funny is I came across an article that had the exact opposite take on Iran.  That it wasn't our heavy-handedness in installing the Shah that hurt, so much as our making the Shah weak by pressuring him to liberalize.  I didn't find the source very credible, especially considering they claim the West instigated the revolution against the Shah as well.  I think the United States lost out too much to justify that theory...but I'm including it because I wanted to highlight how completely different historical analysis can be.  FYI - the source has ties to the John Birch society, and I felt the article drew on the all too common 'realist' notion that ideals make us weak.)


Instead of delving into these topics more deeply, I'm considering what underlying beliefs are necessary to create a sound national security policy.  I don't have anything solid yet, so I'll either wait until the ideas develop more or start writing a stream-of-consciousness type post to see what bubbles up.  Haven't decided yet.

Russia and the US Election

I'm only going to touch on a few of the things swirling around in the news, and mostly to complain about how little I truly know.  I can't tell if I'm seeing shadows or being realistic.  Sometimes I kind of regret not being in the intelligence industry any more.


In the last 24 hours came across three really disturbing articles, when you put them all together:




First, yesterday was an article saying the Russians had asked their government officials to come back home, and bring their families with them.  Now, looking at Snopes this morning it appears it was an informal request, ostensibly because of domestic perception that officials had too many ties to the West. 




Thing is, there's a darn good reason why militaries are especially careful whenever another state is conducting 'training maneuvers' near a border.  It's hard to surprise an opponent when they know you're moving to attack, but if you can make them think something different is happening then you can gain the advantage.



So, does that mean this was something more serious than it sounds?  Who knows.  I don't have the intel access or the basic information needed to really say.  I do think that an 'informal request' from Putin would probably have the effect of a formal order, regardless of what the Russians say.  And I think the perceptions about government officials have probably been around for a while, so I don't know why this would be a major concern right now.  But who knows?  I don't know what's going on with domestic Russian politics.




So on to the second article, Russia's use of inflatable weapons and maskirovka as a strategy.  Now, the Allies used inflatable weapons during World War II to deceive the enemy, so this isn't exactly a sign that the Russians are any trickier than we are.  It does, however, mean it's wise to always look two or three times at what the Russians say they are doing.  Again, I wish I still had a clearance.  And access.




The third article is the one that really spurred writing this post...though again, it's not a direct or obvious threat.  Or rather it is...if this is Putin's roundabout and indirect way of threatening us through surrogates.  Otherwise, it's just another bit of hot air.




Basically, a Putin ally said Americans need to vote for Trump or face nuclear war.  Now, I'm not exactly a war-mongerer...but if they seriously think they can force us to vote for that jack ass all I can say is - "Bring it."

Speaking of Signals

This is pretty ominous.

http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/552839/russia-recalls-officials-deputies-family-children-abroad-return-fatherland-ww3-world-war-3

I won't speculate further, as I know there's information I don't have, w/regards to what's going on.

Realism and Vietnam

So.  Vietnam.




While looking up articles to support this post I came across this one, which nicely sums up three of the views I knew of (the Vietnam War was a crime, the Vietnam War was justified and we were betrayed on the homefront, and that the Vietnam War was a tragic mistake brought about by U.S. leaders who exaggerated the influence of communism and underestimated the power of nationalism)...and added a fourth I hadn't heard of before.  This article makes it clear why I support the third view.  As for the new fourth one, I'm not sure I buy it.  Sure, after the fact it seems to make sense of what was going on.  For the thought processes at the time, though, it doesn't touch on a key argument used to support our involvement in Vietnam.




Namely domino theory.  The belief that if one nation fell to communists, all the neighboring nations would also fall.  The Wikipedia article linked above gives the evidence both in favor and against this theory.  Unsurprisingly, I'm most persuaded by the fact that Thailand, Indonesia, and other large Southeast Asian countries didn't fall after the 1975 end of the Vietnam War.  My opinion was probably also shaped by the fall of the Berlin Wall, which really made the communist threat seem overblown.




With regards to nationalism, it definitely seemed more important than communism in shaping Vietnamese resistance.  Ho Chi Minh's biography again sums up what I learned in college, particularly this bit:




He [Ho Chi Minh] joined a group of Vietnamese nationalists in Paris whose leaders were Phan Chu Trinh and Phan Văn Trường. They had been publishing newspaper articles advocating for Vietnamese independence...Following World War I, the group petitioned for recognition of the civil rights of the Vietnamese people in French Indochina to the Western powers at the Versailles peace talks, but was ignored. Citing the language and the spirit of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, they expected U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to help remove the French colonial rule from Vietnam and ensure the formation of a new, nationalist government.




Our feared enemy cited our own Declaration of Independence and the Wilsonian ideals of self-determination...and became further radicalized when we failed to live up to those ideals.




You could almost say we lost our power and influence because we gave up on an idealistic foreign policy.  Almost. I'm too much of a classic realist to go that far. (I really liked Hans Morgenthau's work, though I think I was a classic realist before I read Politics Among Nations).




One more thing.  No institution is monolithic.  Building up the communist opposition meant acting as though China and the Soviet Union were a single communist entity.  That's part of the genius behind Nixon's visit to China.  I am not entirely sure it was wise in the long run given current events, but I do think it's a better strategy than letting your imagination create a threat that isn't quite as perfect as we built it up to be.


I suppose it's a bit like diamonds - they all have fractures, though some have less than others.  An expert may figure out where to tap the diamond to fracture it entirely...

Decision Making, Fear, and Intelligence Work

“.. Fear is often described as False Evidence Appearing Real.”

― Nick Vujicic, Life Without Limits

Saw this on Facebook yesterday, and it fits what I've been thinking about all too well.  First, though, I wanted to explain why I'm writing about something that happened before I was even born.

Right now there's all sorts of issues going on - Syria, ISIS, Russia, China - and making the right decisions is crucial.  I don't want to say that the decisions I'm about to discuss have direct parallels.  The situations are different.  Russia is not quite the same as the Soviet Union, our relationships with China are different, etc.

What I hope to do, more than anything, is get people thinking more about what signs will prove or disprove any particular belief about the current situation.  It's like prepping a battlefield - if you know the enemy has to take one of three different paths (barring trickery or creativity you aren't prepared for) then you'll want to know which one they're taking.  You can't make assumptions, or your defenses will be set up all wrong and you'll be vulnerable to the side you weren't expecting.  So you figure out what will let you know that they've chosen a particular route.  Maybe sensors far enough away to give you time, but close enough that they won't trigger unless the enemy is committed to that route.  And you have to watch all three routes, not just the one you think is most likely.

So, whether Vietnam or our current mess, the question becomes "what indicators tell us what the enemy is doing?"   

Or to add another cliche:

Hope for the best, plan for the worst...

But don't assume the worst.

Raison d'Etat

Foreign policy experts, for the most part, focus on realism (though one person's realism is not the same as another).  There's a peculiar sort of logic to it, in that experts are not concerned with what is morally right or wrong...the only true test is whether or not you achieve your aims.  On behalf of your nation. 


I deliberately made that a little vague.  Most of those aims are, to be sure, to make your own nation strong and prosperous.  Or secure.  Or somesuch.  All are nicely covered by saying "achieve your aims".


That's part of why figures like Cardinal Richelieu and Otto von Bismarck are such complex and fascinating characters.  Not saints, no.  Yet masters of their time, and mostly in service to their state.  (For good or ill). 


It's hard to judge characters like this, as they are definitely not 'nice', or 'good', or necessarily people we should admire or want to follow.  They managed to do great things, though. 


I brought this up because if we're using Raison d'Etat, or realpolitik, or some other form of realism to determine our own policies than (using that logic) the only way to judge the decisions made is by their results.


It's a harsh method, one that allows no wiggle room for error.  Nor for good intentions.


And by that rubric, American policy in the last 60 or 70 years has not been all that great.


Yes, we saw the end of the Soviet Union.  Yes, we're a very powerful nation.  Our policies haven't been a complete disaster, though how much of that is because of our innate strengths I don't know.  We're a large country, with fairly secure borders (comparatively speaking), a well educated populace and a lot of resources.  We're also dealing with all sorts of turmoil and change.  Globalization, the Information Age, nationalism, multi-nationalist corporations, environmental change...there's been all sorts of challenges.  People have been doing the best they know how, and this isn't meant to point fingers and condemn anyone.


At the same time, can anyone look at Vietnam and say that the United States came out of it stronger?  Can anyone look at our history with Iran and think we're safer, or more secure? 


Can anyone look at the financial crisis, the recession, Syria, rising tensions in the South China sea, tensions with Russia and China (and the Philippines) and think we've been doing well?


Again, I'm not trying to call anyone in particular out.  It's just...


It's just that foreign policy, national security, and the Washington consensus has fads.  Just like businesses, and fashion, and just about everything else.  People aren't ever going to be thrown under the bus for being wrong, if everyone else was wrong too.  So even though 'nobody' saw the fall of the Soviet Union coming when it did (as one example) nobody was going to be penalized for that failure.  After all, everyone made the same mistake.


And nobody was going to be penalized for failing to predict the financial crisis, since hardly anybody credible saw it coming.


Again, this is hard to do.  Like predicting 9/11.  Once you know something happened you can go back and pick through the pieces, figure out which clues foreshadowed the event.  But figuring it out in real time?  Sorting out those pieces, putting them together with the other pieces, and figuring it out in time to actually act on it?


Very, very hard.


And something that's absolutely essential.

Tunnel Vision, and the Problems of Critiquing the Past

Before going into more recent history, I wanted to touch base on some very ancient history.  Namely, the Sicilian Expedition where Athens invaded Sicily during their war with Sparta.  Take a look at this map, from the Wikipedia article previously linked:





Seems kind of crazy that Athens and their allies (in red) would invade Sicily during their fight with Sparta and Sparta's allies (in blue). 


If you read the wikipedia article, you can see why it doesn't seem as crazy as it sounded at first.  There was some prior history, Sicily could aid their enemy, the Athenians had initial success, there were some odd circumstances that were probably not considered predictable (i.e. Nicias's attempt to stop it backfired and the invasion became so large that a defeat was more disastrous than it could have been; also the whole strange tale of Alcibiades.)


You can dig into the weeds, of course, and argue over what played the largest role in the disaster, whether disaster was truly inevitable, and more.  Yet if you pull back a little bit and look at the map, I think there are some obvious dangers. 


First of all, the distance is a problem.  Athens is farther away, which means there's an inevitable delay in sending supplies, communication, and response time.  I particularly want to point out how hard it is to ship horses for the cavalry.


Second, the resources sent to Sicily were not there to assist with allies closer by. (I kind of agree with Pericles, who wanted Athens to consolidate their allies closer to home.)  I think there's some truth to assessing the economics behind a war, though the connection is not always as clear as you'd think.  Anyways, triremes are expensive, and mounting an expedition like this used a lot of Athenian economic power.  Resources that could have been used elsewhere, to better effect.


There's something else that leaps out at me, though given how little Sparta knew about building a navy it doesn't seem relevant in this particular context.  Back then sailors generally hugged the coastline, as you can see by the red route on the map.  That means Athens is sailing past enemy territory for a large part of the journey.  If the Spartans did have more of a navy, they could have blockaded or interdicted the Athenians on any attempt to reach Sicily.  I suppose it's not always a bad idea.  The Allies hopscotched past islands in the Pacific during World War II, and it worked.  I just don't like the potential for an enemy to cut our supply lines, not unless it's a deliberate (and well thought out) strategy as in WWII.


I suppose of Sicily were some sort of key terrain, it might have justified the expedition.  But it really wasn't.  The level of support Sicily might have provided to Sparta was not worth the cost to Athens.


If you want to dig deeper into ancient history, there's plenty to look at.  I brought it up for two reasons.  The first is to point out how easy it is to know who was right and who was wrong when it's ancient history.  The truth, however, is that in the here and now it's always hard to know who to believe.  Who is most accurately assessing the situation.  There's always white noise, always information you have to filter out.  We can hear about the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades and wonder why Nicias didn't win at the time...


But if we were actually there at that point in time we probably would have believed Alcibiades instead.


The second reason?  Even a couple thousand years later we can argue over what did or didn't lead to failure.