Friday, October 28, 2016

In Other News

I find it very disturbing that I hear more about the North Dakota pipeline protests from Facebook and Twitter than my usual news sources.  

I think 2016 proves that the media no longer acts as the Fourth Estate. 

Thursday, October 27, 2016

National Security, Trade

I compared our relationship to China with decisions on whether to unfriend people on Facebook, but that analogy will only carry you so far.  Nations, after all, can't exactly invite each other over to watch a movie together. :)

Nations show friendship in other ways.  Trade deals.  Military support.  Joint training exercises. And more.  (This article discussing our relationship with Saudi Arabia touches on some of it.)

This brings up a pretty important part, actually.  Namely, the role of business and trade in international relations.  This is not new.  The East India company, for example, had a very complicated relationship with the British government.  The Opium Wars are another example.

I think business - multi-national corporations in particular - have grown larger and have a significant impact on the foreign policy of today.  They may, as just one example, push for trade ties with China.  China has a large economic market with a lot of potential for growth, after all, and many businesses will take the risks of operating in China (i.e. the theft of their intellectual property, and other things) in order to get that foot in the door.  This, btw, isn't exactly new.  I came across a book once that described French efforts to steal the secrets of mirror-making from Venice back in the seventh century.  Mirrors!  We take them for granted now, but Venetians actually tried to make it illegal for artisans to leave and set up shop elsewhere.

Here in the United States we're used to thinking of the government as opposed to business, but when it comes to foreign policy they often work hand in hand.  So, for example, we have decisions about granting Most Favoured Nation status to various countries.  We also had business interests in building a pipeline through Afghanistan.

Two things I wanted to point out here.  The first is that our advantageous geopolitical situation does have some drawbacks.  Namely, the average American doesn't easily visit other countries.  If they do, most will go to Canada or Mexico (or take a cruise in the Caribbean), as plane tickets across the ocean are expensive.  The Americans you meet overseas are generally wealthier and more globally aware than the rest.  This may, perhaps, change a bit as the internet and modern communications make us all more connected...but for the most part Americans care more about domestic politics than anything going on in the foreign realm. 

It also means it's harder to persuade the general public that an issue is worth losing American lives over.  After all, what does it matter to us whether or not a pipeline is built in Afghanistan?  And comedians can easily get a laugh by showing how ignorant the average American is about foreign events (like where Aleppo is, or that there's a city called Aleppo and presidential candidates aren't debating about a leppo.  Gary Johnson is not the only one who doesn't know).

The second thing is that there is a point of view w/regards to international relations that thinks more trade ties will lead to peace.  The Trade Interdependence theory as tied to the Capitalist Peace Theory, to be specific.  I personally think this is more wishful thinking than reality, but I will be happy to be proven wrong. (I had an excellent textbook that covered various theories of war and really explored historical examples debunking those theories.  One of my greatest regrets is that I loaned it to someone taking the same class a semester later, and can't recall the title or author anymore.  While I'll admit certain things may make war less likely, I ultimately came to the conclusion that two nations go to war when they think they have more to gain from fighting than not.  I know, this sounds almost too simple to be worth mentioning.  Bear with me.  The point of this obvious explanation is that we can't count on trade ties, or democracy, or any sort of systemic change to create everlasting peace. Instead, we have to be aware of what a nation's interests are, and whether or not they think they can achieve those interests through fighting.  Note, as well, that I said both nations have to feel there is something to gain.  In some cases, what a nation has to gain is so important that we act as though there is no choice.  Self-defense, for example.)

I think we're coming close to a time when these theories will be put to the test.  That is, if our trade ties make World War Three so potentially disastrous that we manage to avoid it...then there may be some truth to the theory.  If we don't avoid it, then all our trade ties did was make it more painful when it happened.  And possibly made our opponents stronger than they'd have been, otherwise.

Makes you wonder what historians will be saying about us a couple hundred years in the future.


Tuesday, October 25, 2016

National Security

http://warontherocks.com/2016/08/lets-talk-about-americas-strategic-choices/?utm_content=buffer2b6a0&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

I finally joined twitter.  I avoided it for ages, but came across an article discussing Rukmini Callimachi's reporting on jihadist movements. 

Anyways, I came across the link above and it fits in well with my current theme.  I'm not sure I agree entirely.  I look forward to the rest of the series.

Clarity, Cosmopolitanism, and Foreign Policy

When I finally figured out what I wanted for my first tattoo, I went to the tattoo artist and tried to explain what I wanted.  A mountain lion, in profile.  It seemed so simple, right?  I could visualize it clearly in my head.  Except that I stumbled when I tried to explain it to the artist.  He told me to bring in an example of what I wanted...a picture or something.  (So I went prowling through the library, looking for a picture of a mountain lion.  And discovered that what I thought was classic and commonplace really wasn't.  It was hard to find a picture of what I wanted.)


Typing things out in a blog is sometimes similar.  I can see something quite clearly in my head.  It seems so bright, and shiny.  Then when I try to put that vision into words I stumble.  I want to get further into foreign policy suggestions, but I realized that the concepts don't flow together well yet.  Once again, I need to cover a few more things first. 


Kwame Appiah has a book called Cosmopolitanism that I recommend to anyone interested in this topic.  He made the point that we don't have to agree on everything in order to get along.  That is, we can have very different values.  Diverse opinions on what's best for our country.  And yet we can still live together peaceably enough. 


It reminds me a bit of my extended family, particularly during Thanksgiving.  I have relatives across the entire spectrum, politically speaking...and for the most part we can all sit down together and enjoy our Thanksgiving meal.  This does, however, presuppose that we all value our relationships more than our politics.


This year, this crazy election year, I have seen various friends on Facebook talk about unfriending or blocking people they disagree with.  They sometimes make very eloquent arguments for why they do so, and I'm not going to say they're wrong.  I will say, however, that it's not the choice I make.


I keep my Facebook feed pretty much wide open, for a couple of reasons.  One is that I don't want to deliberately create a bubble.  When you start curating your feed, filtering out the people who disagree with you, then you only hear part of the debate. 


In looking back, some of my most rewarding and interesting conversations have been with the friends and family across the political aisle.  (It helps that most of them are intelligent people with thoughtful positions.  I can't say it's often changed my mind, but it has added depth to my understanding of the issues.)  This is also, btw, why I don't like calling various people ReThuglicans or DemoRats or whatever the cutesy insult of the day is.


The choice I make can be good or bad, depending.  On the negative side - I don't take as strong a stand as the issues call for.  I am friends with people who don't always share my views, and who express views that some of my other friends would strongly disagree with.


On the other hand, I can sometimes have an impact that others don't.  Because I'm friends with people I disagree with.  (It helps that I don't fit neatly into political stereotypes.  It's harder to dismiss me as a bleeding heart liberal when I've served my country, in Iraq and Afghanistan.)


The point of what so far has been a more personal digression is this.  Some of the same issues (and strengths, and weaknesses) come into play when we decide how we are going to interact with another country.

Take China, for example.  We have very different values, particularly with regards to human rights.  Detaining booksellers from Hong Kong, simply because they sell books that criticize China?  Awful!  The Chinese government must be pretty weak, to find criticism so threatening.


Is this something we should ostracize them for, like banning our Facebook friends?  Is this something we can disagree on, and still sit down for Thanksgiving together? 


Are we better off engaging, maintaining relationships while making our disapproval known? 


Or are we better off cutting ties, so that we aren't supporting it or a part of it?



Sunday, October 23, 2016

National Security and Poker

I wanted to cover one more topic before going into some guidelines/suggestions for our own strategies on national security.

There's an element of art, or gamesmanship, that I can only explain with poker.

Texas Hold 'Em, to be more precise.  (Again, I want to add the caveat that I'm not an expert poker player.  I have an uncle that plays much more seriously than I do, and I'm aware that I sometimes have tells that he can pick up on, for example.  And I don't always know the statistical likelihood of getting a winning hand, so sometimes I play when I probably should have folded and sometimes I fold when I might have done better to play).  In Texas Hold 'Em, each player has two cards that are hidden from the other players' view.  Five more are eventually revealed to the entire group, so you've got some intelligence that everyone can see and some intelligence that only you are aware of. 

You can make guesses about what the other players have, based on what's on the table and how they're playing.  (If they fold, they probably don't have anything that matches up well with what's on the table.  If they bet big, they might be holding on to a pocket pair of aces.  Or cards that play well with the flop, and might lead to a flush, a straight, or three of a kind.)

In addition to the mechanics of the game, however, a lot of poker is based on being able to read the players around you.  You can bluff, and perhaps win the pot with nothing.  Push other players out of the game when you don't really have anything.  But bluffing, in my experience, can also make you lose big.  That is, if the other player has a good enough hand to stay in the game they'll probably keep playing regardless of how big you bluff...and you're single ace is just not going to win the pot. 

Actually, when you're going head to head with someone there's a lot of quick games where each side knows their cards are bad (or good) and one side quickly folds.  Then you just slowly lose the money you have to put in the pot (with two people, you're always the small blind or the big blind, so you're going to keep losing money if you keep folding).  Then you either have to get really good cards or bluff.  So in those situations you can recoup your losses by bluffing, but if the other player has a worthwhile hand you can also lose big.  In my little bit of experience each round goes pretty quick until either both sides have good hands and commit to bidding (and one side doesn't have as good a hand as they think), or one side tries to bluff the other out and loses.  Otherwise whoever has the largest number of chips can probably outlast the other just by refusing to get sucked in unless their cards are great.

Like I keep saying, go find a real expert if you want a better discussion.

I brought this up, though, because there are some similarities to foreign policy.  There's some information only you know, there's some information everyone knows, and there's some information the other side has that you don't.  You're reputation and the signals you send can make a difference.  You might be able to bluff and get away with it.  Or you bluff, and they call your bluff, and you lose. 

Bluffing...

Sometimes it's worth bluffing and losing, just so the other side is aware that you sometimes bluff.  That's more if you want to sucker them in with a good hand, make them think you're bluffing when you're not.  And sometimes you also want to show that you've got the cards to back your actions up, so that they know it's not always a bluff.  That might make them back down in the future when you really don't have anything.

This is tied to two things.  First, Vietnam.  You could say that Vietnam was a situation where someone called our bluff.  That is, Vietnam wasn't an existential threat.  The American people stopped supporting it as the body count added up and didn't really see any reason to keep fighting for something that ultimately wasn't really a threat to us.  But losing in Vietnam meant more people questioned whether we really have as good a hand as we sometimes imply.  That did cause problems for us, because more people are likely to take the risk of calling our bluff, assuming it's a bluff.  This is part of the problem we have in Syria.  If we escalate our engagement there, are we really committed to it?  Or, if the body count adds up and we get tied up there for a decade or more, will our people eventually get tired of it and call for us to leave?  (Iraq adds to that analysis, since everyone and their mother saw that the American people were tired of it after five years of fighting.)  I would say that Vietnam was not an existential threat, and that it doesn't necessarily mean we're weak when it's important...but our government is still responsive to the will of the people and what we consider 'important' is not necessarily what our leadership claims it is.

Second, Syria and Russia today.  Russia is sending signals that they are very committed to keeping Assad in power.  Is it a bluff?  Can and will they back it up?  Do we have the commitment and resources to call that bluff, if it's a bluff in the first place?  Or do are they holding a pocket pair of aces, and will we wind up folding as soon as they reveal their hand?  Or do they have a pocket pair of aces, but the flop was all clubs and we've got a pocket pair of clubs?  In which case we'll have a showdown, but ultimately come out on top since our hand is better.

Does that make your head hurt?

What I wanted to get to, with all of that, is that some of our strategy is going to depend on how well we all are reading each other.  How well we know the cards we have, what educated guesses we can make about the cards the other side is holding, our estimates of whether the other side has a good hand or not, and whether we in turn decide to play, fold, or bluff.  It's not as straightforward as analyzing who has how strong of a military, because it depends as much on human psychology as it does on the actual cards in play.


Cyber Warfare

Cyberwarfare.  Everyone know that's the next big thing, but nobody seems to know how it will really play out.  (This is part of why I'd like to take some classes in computer science - to learn more about what's possible)

We know a bit about what we've seen so far.  Stuxnet.  The 2007 attack on EstoniaTitan Rain.  Criminals that use cyber attacks to get money - through ransomware, DDOS attacks, and more. I also know a little, very little about what's possible.  Like the ability to hack someone's vehicle.

Cyberattacks are odd, in that it's hard to say if an attack is state-sponsored or based on individual criminal behavior.  Attributing an attack to state is...difficult.  Which also makes it hard to determine how a state should respond.  Would a cyberattack be grounds for war?  Would it lead to a more conventional response?  At this point, there's a lot of uncertainty about it.

I want to point out a couple of things.  DDOS attacks, to me at least, are more of a minor annoyance than a real threat.  I wasn't aware of the recent attack until after the fact, for example, because I was at work and wasn't trying to access any of the sites affected.  For me, as long as I can wait anywhere from a couple of hours or more, it's not a big deal.  Yet criminals are apparently able to make money off of these, because businesses lose money the entire time the system is down. (These issues, btw, raise questions about whether we want political leaders who have a poor understanding of computer issues.  It does not seem uncommon for older and more established politicians, for example, to be uncomfortable with smart phones and other aspects of the internet.)

While I heartily recommend talking to someone with real expertise on these issues, I do want to make a few points.

First, given what I said about how little Friday's DDOS attack affected me personally, some attacks are not really effective if you're able to unplug.  This is worth pointing out, as there still are a number of people who haven't moved into the internet world completely.  Granted, most of them are a bit older...but in my current job I am repeatedly astounded at how many of my employees are not comfortable with or familiar with what I used to consider basic computing skills.  I've had to assist them with figuring out how to get information over the internet - whether using a website to get a company award, or information on their retirement plans, and more. 

I do wonder whether cyberattacks would be more problematic in another twenty or thirty years, as people who know how to do things the old way are no longer around.  (For example - when I was in the military we all learned how to read maps.  Nowadays, many people use the GPS on their phones to navigate.  If an attack took down GPS, how many people could navigate using a map?)  Or take the example I used earlier where someone hacked a car.  Older cars might be safer, since they don't have all the computer chips and whatnot inside. 

It also means that EPM attacks are a very, very serious concern...since it would shut down a LOT of things we've become dependent on.

The importance of the internet is also worth pointing out, though again we still have old technology (like radios) that we can fall back on if need be.

I'm posting this more to point out the very large question mark we all should have with regards to cyberattacks, then to provide any real answers.  I think/hope that most countries are taking steps to secure any critical infrastructure, and have fallback plans in place in case computer chips and technology fail.  I believe the Department of Defense has taken steps to create a Cyber Command, and this could well become another branch (Air, Land, Sea...and now Cyber?)


Presidential Election 2016

http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/opinion/sunday/the-dangers-of-hillary-clinton.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0&referer=https://t.co/swZLfvqCfC

Nice to see something capture my opinion so very well.

Trade, Government Policy, and Economics

https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/10/preserving-sweet-life-minnesota

This is the first article I've ever read that really explains the issues tied to government agricultural subsidies. 

Saturday, October 22, 2016

American National Strategy - Cont.

I discussed the rather conventional geopolitical scenario for the United States in my last post.  I wanted to discuss economics next.

Or rather, if we are talking about an existential threat, there's not a lot that we should truly be worried about.  But tanks can't fight if they don't have fuel.  People can't live if they can't get food.  And there's a lot more to security than just having a lot of tanks and planes and soldiers.

Economics - well.  I'm not an economist, and I recommend you take what I'm about to post with some skepticism, since I admit I am not an expert here.  (When I daydream, I sometimes imagine I was wealthy enough to just putz around taking classes in economics, computer science, and finance...and then blog here about any interesting intersectionality.  I don't want a degree in those fields, I just want to know them well enough to help build my understanding of the world we live in today.)

So anyways, there are two or three points I want to make about economics.  First, nations do compete for scarce resources.  Access to those resources may not quite count as an existential threat, or maybe it does.  I phrased it that way to make a point about how different countries view this issue.  One way of assessing our economic security is to see how capable we are of guaranteeing the resources we would need. (With regards to energy, for example, we have a somewhat mixed outlook.  We do have our own domestic energy supplies.  Oil, natural gas, etc.  Some of that has been aided by fracking, and where energy security fits in with environmental concerns is a debate worth having at some point.  But we are still a net consumer, not producer, of oil.  So even though we probably could tighten our belts and ration resources if need be, we would struggle to keep our current standard of living without external sources.  We are in a much better condition than Europe, however, and Russia's use of Gazprom in their foreign policy is something to pay attention to.) 

Btw, economic security isn't just about energy.  Or rare earth minerals, even.  It's also about the basics of food, water, and enough resources for a sustained wartime effort.  The US is in a good position, again, w/regards to food.  We are quite the breadbasket, after all.  I get a little fuzzy on exactly what is necessary here, but I do believe Athens lasted so long after their failed Sicilian Expedition in part because of their strong maritime trade-based economy.  And that it's worth paying attention to the debate on how effective the Anaconda Plan was during the Civil War.  There's also merit to those who point out that our enemies used very inexpensive IEDs to take out very expensive Strykers and other pieces of military equipment.  In a sustained effort, can we afford to keep spending millions of dollars on equipment that our enemies destroy using parts that only cost a couple hundred dollars?

Economic security, however, gets into tricky territory.  After all, our involvement with installing the shah in Iran was allegedly about oil security, and it rather backfired on us.

Second, I want to go into the importance of trade routes, and trade in general.  Given what's been going on in this election year, a lot of people are questioning the benefit of trade and globalization.  We have grown so interconnected, btw, that it's really hard to say who is dependent on what, and where.  That is, we have Toyota cars built in the United States.  American finished goods with subcomponents from China, Malaysia, Singapore, and more. 

Again, I want to emphasize that you should talk to a good economist if you're interested in the subject.  But I'll give a little anecdote that, oversimplified though it is, may be useful.

Picture the original independent farmstead.  The family living there grows their own food, weaves their own clothes, milks their own cows, builds their own houses with material from their own fields and nearby land.

Now picture a neighbor moves in close by.  The neighboring family has a field that isn't very good for planting, but is pretty good for pasturing cows.  So the second family decides to get a few more cows than they need for their own sake, and offers to sell the extra milk to their neighbors.  Those neighbors no longer need to keep their own cow, so maybe they sell the cow and turn the cow pasture into another field.  Now they're growing more corn or wheat or whatever than they need for themselves, so they can turn around and sell that to their neighbor.  Or take it to market. 

Trading that surplus benefits both families.  They're able to get more of what they need, they don't have to spend as much effort trying to do it all themselves, etc.  But trade also makes it harder to go back to true independence.  If disaster struck, the family that had sold their cow would have to invest in a new cow and turn a field back into pasture if they wanted to get their own milk again.

So anyways.  Trade is good, mostly.  But it leads to specialization and interdependence.  And when you throw in nationalism, elite gamemanship, imperialism, globalization and multi-national corporations then the benefits may go to one particular group more than the others (and hurt others more than they benefit by it.)

The third factor I wanted to discuss was trade routes.  Shipping, btw, is still one of the fastest and cheapest ways of getting material from point A to point B.  Basically you can fit a lot more product on a ship than you can on a train, plane, or truck.  You can't use trains and trucks to ship across the ocean, and planes just can't hold as much material.  So shipping lanes are pretty important.

Take a look at this map:

https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/d6/1e/bc/d61ebc19f39134862b5f8c91e39b2559.jpg

It kind of gives you a sense of the largest shipping routes and some key locations.  The Strait of Malacca, the Panama Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Suez Canal are all areas where trade must either flow through a constricted area or take a very long way around.  Actually, here's a nice little article talking about 8 global choke points.  Primarily discussing the flow of oil, but more trade goods than just oil ship through these chokepoints.

If you pay attention to history and/or current events, most of these names should already be familiar.  I want to point to our history with Panama and the Panama Canal, though, because the transition from our control to Panama illustrates some strategic points.  Namely that we don't actually have to control these choke points, so long as we have the freedom to navigate through them.

This is part of why the South China Sea is so tense right now (the possibility of oil within the sea itself is also a factor).  We sail around to make a point of the freedom of the seas, China sees it as an infringement on their territory, and all it will take is one stupid hothead and a few leaders unable or unwilling to look weak and we could wind up in a war with China.  The thing of it is, though, that so long as everyone is able to sail through the Strait of Malacca (and so long as there is no unreasonable taxes or duties that effectively limit usage) it shouldn't actually matter to much who has nominal control.  I'm sure that betrays something about my own ignorance of the area...and perhaps it doesn't matter so much to us (given how far away we are), whereas to the small nations around there it could make a tremendous difference to their economy.

And, of course, there's always the fear that if China did control the straits and was hostile to the US, it would seriously impact our shipping.

Thursday, October 20, 2016

American National Strategy - Current Situation

On to the fun stuff, though where do I start?  I just spent a lot of time discussing the importance of the situation at hand, so I could start discussing economics, globalization, Syria, technological changes, nuclear weapons, or any other number of things.  And I'll probably get to those.  Eventually.

For now I want to start with the basics.  Geopolitics.  Let's start with existential threats.  Here's a map of the United States:

 Image result for map United States

The United States is in a pretty enviable position here.  The continental US has two large oceans to our east and west.  Our major neighbors are Canada and Mexico, neither of which is (currently) much of a threat.  People don't always realize just how much space we're talking about here, either.  I mean, you can drive across England in about 13 or 14 hours, which is almost as long as it takes an American to drive through Texas.

We get along pretty well with Canada (shared language and history), though our relationship with Mexico is a little more problematic. Actually, one of the worst case conventional scenarios I could imagine is a hostile Mexico allied with a large enemy.  A force like that could cross our border and drive straight up the middle.  Yes, I know, doesn't seem likely right now...but I think a core policy should be keeping our neighbors friendly.  Neutral at worst.  And we definitely don't want to push them into outright hostility. (A realist may point out that we could instead try to keep our neighbors weak.  Sort of like Richelieu and what came to be Germany.  I personally don't think it's a good idea, partly because even if they're weak they can ally with a larger hostile country, partly because you will probably fail eventually, partly because changing norms make it less acceptable today than back in Richelieu's day, but primarily because I don't think our strength is dependent on keeping others weak.  And if you believe in free trade, which is kind of a big question this year, you must admit that countries with strong economies make better trading partners. If we worked with Mexico to end the drug war, undercut the cartels, get the corrupting drug money out of Mexican politics, and basically did our bit to help Mexico grow then one side effect is they'd probably have fewer people trying to immigrate here illegally.)

So.  It wouldn't be easy to attack us directly.  Probably the only nations with a better geography are islands like the UK, Japan, and Australia.  Which is where the next bit comes in - population.

 
Rank Country Population % of Population
  World 7,256,490,011
1 China 1,367,485,388 18.84%
2 India 1,251,695,584 17.25%
3 United States 321,368,864 4.43%
9 Russia 142,423,773 1.96%
10 Japan 126,919,659 1.75%
11 Mexico 121,736,809 1.68%
12 Philippines 100,998,376 1.39%
16 Iran 81,824,270 1.13%
17 Germany 80,854,408 1.11%
18 Turkey 79,414,269 1.09%
21 France 66,553,766 0.92%
22 United Kingdom 64,088,222 0.88%
23 Italy 61,855,120 0.85%

Yes, China and India together  make up 36% of the world population.  They have a LOT of people.  China has four times our own population.

And we have twice as many as Russia.  Almost as much as Russia, Iran and the Philippines combined.  (Actually, I find this sort of comparison very interesting.  I didn't realize Japan had almost as many people as Russia.)  Population count isn't everything, of course.  Some countries are aging, others have too many  men and not enough women.  There are different education levels and different fitness levels.  Yet the population count does help give some perspective on what size military you can expect a nation to field. 

We, for example, have less than a half a percentage of our entire population in the armed forces.  And yet we still have a larger military than Russia (according to this site, Russia has the fourth largest military with 766,055 to our 1,400,000.  In 2014 they're also estimated to spend 4.5% of their GDP on defense spending, as opposed to our 3.5%.) 

Speaking of GDP, here's some world rankings:

Nation                    GDP (in billions)        Rank
United States           18,561.93                   1
China                        11,391.62                   2
Japan                          4,730.30                   3
Germany                     3,494.90                   4
India                             2,250.99                   7
Russia                         1,267.75                 12


So what does it all mean?  Well, if you don't count nukes, or cyberwarfare, or terrorism, or pandemics and large scale natural disasters, then we're pretty much unassailable on the continental United States. 

I hate saying that, and I keep trying to quality it further.  It feels like the kind of statement the world loves to prove wrong.  At the same time if I throw in too many exceptions it weakens the point - We're large both physically and demographically, we've got good geographic boundaries, and we have a strong economy.  We'd be really, really, hard to take on directly.

That's not the entire story, of course.  Just keep it in the back of your mind when I get into the next bit.
 

National Security Musings, Cont.

I want to get into the nitty gritty of strategy, but I do think there's a couple of points about human nature I should make first.


There does seem to be a universal (or almost entirely) universal desire for respect.  Fairness. Decency.  We can train ourselves out of it, teach ourselves that 'the world is not fair' and that 'this is just the way it is', but it's something that we lose because of life experiences and the choices we make.  It's not something natural.


Which is why universal human rights are so powerful.  It's not so much that the ideal matches reality, as that so long as reality fails at this...we are likely to see unrest and instability.  Sure, 9/10 people will put their heads down and get on with life, no matter what.  And yet there will always be that tenth troublemaker, that young person who hasn't had reality beat into them yet, or an old person who is too tired to care. 


We can argue about what should and shouldn't be considered a human right, about where these ideas came from, and more.  Later.  What I wanted to focus on the most, here, is that living up to these ideals says something powerful, too.  It says that you can lead a nation without arresting everyone who disagrees with you, or makes fun of you, or makes you the butt of a joke.  That you can successfully impose law and order without resorting to torture.  That such things are actually unnecessary to ruling, at all.


Which has certain implications - namely, that all the states who do engage in such behavior aren't doing it for reasons of state.  The state can survive without it.  Rather, all the rulers engaging in such behavior are doing it because they've confused their own self interest with the needs of the state


What that also means is that every time we fail to live up to our ideals, we show that we don't truly believe that we can succeed while staying true to our ideals.  That we don't think we can win without torture, or manipulating elections, or arresting those who disagree with us. (Kind of reminds me of an ex-boyfriend of mine, discussing 'Buy America' and Toyota.  What he basically said was that he would buy the best car, whoever made it.  And if that car wasn't American than we need to get our act together and start making the best car instead.  Win not by pulling down the competition, but by pushing ourselves to be better.  This, btw, is the exact opposite of what Donald Trump is doing.  He's not going to "Make America Great Again" by creating an environment where we have the best manufacturers.  Instead, he's going to do it by trying to make it harder for the competition to sell to us.  Granted, you can say other countries have been manipulating the system in their favor already.  This is another topic too long and complicated to get into right now, but I want to point out that we need challenged to be better and do better, to rise to the challenge.  Not to whine about what other countries are doing.)


During the Cold War that I've been writing about, you could argue that a lot of our actions were taken because we didn't truly believe in capitalism.  After all, if capitalism was the right path all we had to do was wait.  Other countries will figure it out, eventually.  Even if the very worst happened, if communism had swept the globe and capitalism had fallen by the wayside, if the beliefs were correct wouldn't they eventually have been resurrected?


The fear of communism, then, actually shows how little faith we have in our own system.  Just as the justifications for 'enhanced interrogation methods' reveal how little we actually believe in rights such as "no cruel and unusual punishment".  Sure, this was not applied to US citizens...but if we truly believe this is a right, then we should be practicing it 100%.  Not deciding it's wrong for US citizens and acceptable for terrorists. 


Ideals aren't something we're supposed to give up just because things get tough. 







Tuesday, October 18, 2016

National Strategy - Idealism

I want to talk about idealist vs. realist foreign policy, but I've kind of been scared to.  Or rather, I'm scared of the possible conclusions. 

How so?

Well...if we say that we should live up to our ideals, then what's to keep us from going around and trying to make everyone else do so as well?  "Become a capitalist democratic federal republic or we'll invade!"  (Which is essentially what Russia claims we do).

Then there's the problems at a strategic level.  Same problem we faced in a counterinsurgency.  If you try to be everywhere at once, you're going to be rather weak everywhere.  You won't be anywhere in sufficient strength to really make a difference (if your opposition is determined). 

It's also the same problem with tackling poverty, I think.  If some wealthy philanthropist decided to give all their money away equally, everyone would end up with such a small amount that it wouldn't make a difference.  Idealism may be great in theory...but how do you apply it to the real world dilemmas of our time? 

How do you apply idealism about human rights, say, consistently?  If Russia and China think we're not serious about human rights, it's hard to blame them...we've been so inconsistent.  (Though I think they believe human rights is just something we bring up to conceal a more selfish interest, rather than understanding that it's mostly genuine and the only inconsistency is that our realists don't feel it's worth risking our necks over.)

At the same time, idealism is actually pretty important.  It what's gives us a future worth fighting for.  A future TO fight for.  Head in the clouds and unrealistic though idealists may be, their the ones that actually make the world a different (and sometimes better) place.  Those who accept the world the way it is and learn to conform, realistic though they may be, are pretty much ensuring that the future is just like the present.  In all it's flaws.

Not only that, Jim Collins noted that the corporations that lasted all had a greater purpose than simply 'to make money'.  In a similar fashion, I think most people need to feel like their group is about more than selfish survival.  That's what I like about this facebook meme:



Image result for meme tumblr "our heroic"

No matter what you call us vs them, you can see that each side is pretty much exactly the same.  That what you call them is just a matter of perspective.  Is this always true?  No, I don't think so.  Yet to reasonably say that our side is better, we have to be about something more than just "raison d'etat" 

Otherwise, well...a government is a government is a government, and it probably doesn't matter too much who is in charge so long as they make the trains run on time. (Since someone might misunderstand - I'm half joking here.  Later on I might go into different economic systems and what they mean, or discuss the development of nationalism, and how little it mattered in earlier time periods.  Right now it would be too much of a digression.)

That's enough for now.  I still haven't gotten to the heart of our own strategy, but this seems like a good stopping point for now.


Sunday, October 16, 2016

Rural vs Urban America

For what's supposed to be a humorous website, this article has some very good points.  Warning, though, there is cussing involved.

http://www.cracked.com/blog/6-reasons-trumps-rise-that-no-one-talks-about/

I know drug addiction is a problem in rural areas, and I've seen many small towns that are struggling today.  Two main things I wanted to point out.

First -  with modern technology, it really doesn't have to be that way.  Especially if telecommuting jobs continue to grow.  I know a lot of people seem to prefer living in big cities, but I've got to admit that I don't see the appeal.  Sure, I like to visit them on occasion.  And it's nice to have more options.  Better restaurants, bigger dating pool, enough customers to support more specialized shops.  But get stuck in traffic every day trying to get to work?  No thanks. 

I live literally five minutes from work.  As well as the grocery store, Barnes and Noble, and various places to eat and shop.  If I can't find it here (or on the internet),  I can spend a weekend in Chicago or Indianapolis or St Louis.  But I'm not giving up two hours of every work day just sitting in traffic.

Cost of living is also significantly cheaper.  So why are rural towns dying?  Why aren't businesses sick of city costs pushing back out?  (couple of answers -  some are.  Others need to be close to their market, or need the creativity that comes from random interactions which occur more easily in a city.  Still, technology has made it so much easier to work remotely... We really ought to be decentralizing more.  Take, for example, DC.  On the one hand, it'd be harder to network and build connections if you're not in DC.  On the other hand, the pentagon and various federal agencies make a nice big military target and much of the analysis and reporting could be done anywhere.  We'll, depending on the classification level of course.  Even with that, though, some analysis can be done in SCIFs at our various bases and don't require actually being in DC.  Surely there's potential there?)

Anyways, second thing?  Did you take a look at that map?  America is a sea of Republican red, with Democratic blue islands.  Yes, due to the population density those islands of blue have larger populations.  Hence why Chicago helps make Illinois reliably blue, despite the red rural areas.  It helps explain some of that political polarization we talk so much about.  It's not just the segregation as social classes sort into various neighborhoods.  It's also that someone in a small town is generally surrounded by like minded people, whereas those in a city are likely to also be surrounded by those who see things their way.

National Security Musings

The trouble with writing this post is that there are so many choices.  I have to weigh various ideas and ask myself 'is this just good to know, or is it critical to our understanding of national security?' 

There's a lot out there that is just good to know, particularly with regards to game theory, negotiation, nationalism, economics, technological change, and more. 

The first point I want to make, or remake (as I can't emphasize this enough) is that everything is situationally dependent.  Getting a clear-eyed view of the situation is over half the problem, especially since there are so many reasons to obscure or hide what's going on.

That said, getting that clear eyed view is a bit like qualitative analysis.  That is - quantitative analysis seems solid and reassuring, since it's based on numbers and facts.  Find a good sample size, conduct a poll, run some analysis on the results.  Maybe get a standard deviation, or regression analysis, or something.

Qualitative analysis can be different.  It involves in depth interviews with small groups of people.  Yet it's important, as well, because sometimes how we frame the situation determines what we find.  You can't create a poll and run statistical analysis if you don't know what questions to ask in the first place, or how to explain a correlation in your findings.  Qualitative analysis, then, ideally involves an open-minded and in depth inquiry into a particular situation...which allows you to develop some sort of framework as to what factors are involved, how and why.

Qualitative studies work hand in hand with quantitative, since once you have a theory about what's  going on you can create your quantitative studies and do some research to validate your framework.  See if the correlations match what you predicted, etc.

In order to get a clear eyed understanding for a national strategy, you have to know what questions to ask in the first place, and how to interpret the answers.  (This is why I'm going into those underlying assumptions in more depth.)

Underlying assumptions can encompass anything.  Optimist or pessimist?  Cooperation or competition?  Do we live in a world where every nation is out for itself, or is there room for common ground?  Zero sum game, or the opportunity for a win-win?

These things seem very basic, almost not worth mentioning.  Yet consider water rights.

When I was in Helmand province, water was a big issue.  People who lived upriver could use water freely, and grow crops that required plenty of irrigation.  Those downriver, on the other hand, were left to make do with water that was more scarce and sometimes even salty.  This limited what crops can grow profitably.  (Opium, btw, grows in these conditions well enough that finding an economically comparable alternative for farmers is difficult.  Especially since there was apparently a new strain established that used even less water.)

I talked to a hydrologist about the situation, and he insisted that there was enough water for everyone - it's just that everyone had to agree on how to use that water.  This is where underlying assumptions come into play.  If you think cooperation is possible, if you think other people would abide by an agreement, then it makes sense to get together and negotiate how you're going to use that water.

If, on the other hand, you think agreement is impossible, that everyone is selfish, and that everyone is going to ignore the agreement and get as much water as they can regardless...then there's no point negotiating anything.  Get what water you can get, while the getting is good.  (This also ties in with game theory, and social dilemmas.  Understand that game theory is often based on artificial environments where students or other subjects are asked to respond to various scenarios.  It's an interesting field that raises good points about how we actually interact, but be careful about how you apply those findings to the real world.)

So anyways.  Applying this to national security - if you think we're capable of creating, implementing, and enforcing an agreement then you will think one way.  If, on the other hand, you think it's impossible...you'll choose a completely different set of options. (Consider how this applies to the recent nuclear treaty with Iran).

What I'm personally most interested in, btw, is how you change from one view to another.  Or rather, from distrust and opposition to cooperation...the other direction happens all too easily on it's own.

That is, if the hydrologist in Helmand was right and there was plenty of water (if everyone worked together) then how do you convince people to cooperate and support such an agreement?  Particularly when their own history and experience shows that such agreement is unlikely?

Saturday, October 15, 2016

National Security, Current and Historical Events

Due to current events, I've been rethinking how I was going to write my next few posts.  It seems that (much though I was planning to avoid it) I actually have to write about some of my  underlying thought processes. 

Take the current situation with Russa, regarding Syria and the US elections.  There are some Americans arguing that we need to be firm, that Russia sees anything less as a sign of weakness and will keep pushing unless or until we do stand firm.  Others see the potential for the situation to escalate out of hand, and do not think we should risk starting World War III over Syria.

Historically, there's merit to both arguments.  For a while there, some Americans thought Saddam Hussein misinterpreted a discussion with our State Dept as an indication that the US would do nothing if he invaded Kuwait.  (Reading up on it now, clearly more information has developed since I heard about this in college...and it looks like this isn't actually what happened.)

On the flip side, historians say that Germany helped create the conditions for World War I because they had lost almost all their allies except Austria, and so had to demonstrate their firm commitment to their ally...which helped expand what could have been a much more local conflict into something global. (Otto van Bismarck allegedly believed that Germany was at risk of encirclement, and worked hard to maintain good relations with his neighbors.  Kaiser Wilhelm wasn't quite so adept at foreign policy, and managed to alienate almost everyone.) 

Given the articles I posted a couple of days ago, I decided to check around a bit online.  One article said that Russia had to support Assad, because if Assad is overthrown then Iran is the only ally they have left in the region.

What's funny is that this article is discussing the decline of Russian influence (and paints the support for Assad as a sign of that weakness, much like Germany supporting Austria), whereas a lot of other articles are basically saying that Russia is standing strong and making the United States look weak and ineffective.

I don't know enough about the situation to say what's truly going on, unfortunately.  It seems like there are two (or more) ways of analyzing the situation, and the recommended course of action for one scenario is the absolutely worst thing you could do if the second is closer to reality.  And vice versa.

Anyways.  The point of this post was to say I'm changing up what I was going to write about.  I planned to discuss our relationship with Iran - I don't think anyone can say that our policies towards Iran have made  us more secure over the past thirty or forty decades.  Our involvement with the Iranian coup in 1953 was a factor in our hostile relations since the revolution.  What's funny is that according to Wilsonian ideals we should never have done gotten involved like that. 

Were the American individuals who supported the coup the realists?  Or should they have expected and predicted the backlash we received?  After all, we were once a colony ourselves.  We fought our own revolution against imperial rule.  If any great nation should have understood how resentful a nation can be when outside powers appear to be in control, it was the United States. 

(What's funny is I came across an article that had the exact opposite take on Iran.  That it wasn't our heavy-handedness in installing the Shah that hurt, so much as our making the Shah weak by pressuring him to liberalize.  I didn't find the source very credible, especially considering they claim the West instigated the revolution against the Shah as well.  I think the United States lost out too much to justify that theory...but I'm including it because I wanted to highlight how completely different historical analysis can be.  FYI - the source has ties to the John Birch society, and I felt the article drew on the all too common 'realist' notion that ideals make us weak.)


Instead of delving into these topics more deeply, I'm considering what underlying beliefs are necessary to create a sound national security policy.  I don't have anything solid yet, so I'll either wait until the ideas develop more or start writing a stream-of-consciousness type post to see what bubbles up.  Haven't decided yet.


Thursday, October 13, 2016

Russia and the US Election

I'm only going to touch on a few of the things swirling around in the news, and mostly to complain about how little I truly know.  I can't tell if I'm seeing shadows or being realistic.  Sometimes I kind of regret not being in the intelligence industry any more.


In the last 24 hours came across three really disturbing articles, when you put them all together:




First, yesterday was an article saying the Russians had asked their government officials to come back home, and bring their families with them.  Now, looking at Snopes this morning it appears it was an informal request, ostensibly because of domestic perception that officials had too many ties to the West. 




Thing is, there's a darn good reason why militaries are especially careful whenever another state is conducting 'training maneuvers' near a border.  It's hard to surprise an opponent when they know you're moving to attack, but if you can make them think something different is happening then you can gain the advantage.



So, does that mean this was something more serious than it sounds?  Who knows.  I don't have the intel access or the basic information needed to really say.  I do think that an 'informal request' from Putin would probably have the effect of a formal order, regardless of what the Russians say.  And I think the perceptions about government officials have probably been around for a while, so I don't know why this would be a major concern right now.  But who knows?  I don't know what's going on with domestic Russian politics.




So on to the second article, Russia's use of inflatable weapons and maskirovka as a strategy.  Now, the Allies used inflatable weapons during World War II to deceive the enemy, so this isn't exactly a sign that the Russians are any trickier than we are.  It does, however, mean it's wise to always look two or three times at what the Russians say they are doing.  Again, I wish I still had a clearance.  And access.




The third article is the one that really spurred writing this post...though again, it's not a direct or obvious threat.  Or rather it is...if this is Putin's roundabout and indirect way of threatening us through surrogates.  Otherwise, it's just another bit of hot air.




Basically, a Putin ally said Americans need to vote for Trump or face nuclear war.  Now, I'm not exactly a war-mongerer...but if they seriously think they can force us to vote for that jack ass all I can say is - "Bring it."





Wednesday, October 12, 2016

Speaking of Signals

This is pretty ominous.

http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/552839/russia-recalls-officials-deputies-family-children-abroad-return-fatherland-ww3-world-war-3

I won't speculate further, as I know there's information I don't have, w/regards to what's going on.

Tuesday, October 11, 2016

Realism and Vietnam

So.  Vietnam.




While looking up articles to support this post I came across this one, which nicely sums up three of the views I knew of (the Vietnam War was a crime, the Vietnam War was justified and we were betrayed on the homefront, and that the Vietnam War was a tragic mistake brought about by U.S. leaders who exaggerated the influence of communism and underestimated the power of nationalism)...and added a fourth I hadn't heard of before.  This article makes it clear why I support the third view.  As for the new fourth one, I'm not sure I buy it.  Sure, after the fact it seems to make sense of what was going on.  For the thought processes at the time, though, it doesn't touch on a key argument used to support our involvement in Vietnam.




Namely domino theory.  The belief that if one nation fell to communists, all the neighboring nations would also fall.  The Wikipedia article linked above gives the evidence both in favor and against this theory.  Unsurprisingly, I'm most persuaded by the fact that Thailand, Indonesia, and other large Southeast Asian countries didn't fall after the 1975 end of the Vietnam War.  My opinion was probably also shaped by the fall of the Berlin Wall, which really made the communist threat seem overblown.




With regards to nationalism, it definitely seemed more important than communism in shaping Vietnamese resistance.  Ho Chi Minh's biography again sums up what I learned in college, particularly this bit:




He [Ho Chi Minh] joined a group of Vietnamese nationalists in Paris whose leaders were Phan Chu Trinh and Phan Văn Trường. They had been publishing newspaper articles advocating for Vietnamese independence...Following World War I, the group petitioned for recognition of the civil rights of the Vietnamese people in French Indochina to the Western powers at the Versailles peace talks, but was ignored. Citing the language and the spirit of the U.S. Declaration of Independence, they expected U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to help remove the French colonial rule from Vietnam and ensure the formation of a new, nationalist government.




Our feared enemy cited our own Declaration of Independence and the Wilsonian ideals of self-determination...and became further radicalized when we failed to live up to those ideals.




You could almost say we lost our power and influence because we gave up on an idealistic foreign policy.  Almost. I'm too much of a classic realist to go that far. (I really liked Hans Morgenthau's work, though I think I was a classic realist before I read Politics Among Nations).




One more thing.  No institution is monolithic.  Building up the communist opposition meant acting as though China and the Soviet Union were a single communist entity.  That's part of the genius behind Nixon's visit to China.  I am not entirely sure it was wise in the long run given current events, but I do think it's a better strategy than letting your imagination create a threat that isn't quite as perfect as we built it up to be.


I suppose it's a bit like diamonds - they all have fractures, though some have less than others.  An expert may figure out where to tap the diamond to fracture it entirely...

Decision Making, Fear, and Intelligence Work

“.. Fear is often described as False Evidence Appearing Real.”
― Nick Vujicic, Life Without Limits



Saw this on Facebook yesterday, and it fits what I've been thinking about all too well.  First, though, I wanted to explain why I'm writing about something that happened before I was even born.


Right now there's all sorts of issues going on - Syria, ISIS, Russia, China - and making the right decisions is crucial.  I don't want to say that the decisions I'm about to discuss have direct parallels.  The situations are different.  Russia is not quite the same as the Soviet Union, our relationships with China are different, etc.


What I hope to do, more than anything, is get people thinking more about what signs will prove or disprove any particular belief about the current situation.  It's like prepping a battlefield - if you know the enemy has to take one of three different paths (barring trickery or creativity you aren't prepared for) then you'll want to know which one they're taking.  You can't make assumptions, or your defenses will be set up all wrong and you'll be vulnerable to the side you weren't expecting.  So you figure out what will let you know that they've chosen a particular route.  Maybe sensors far enough away to give you time, but close enough that they won't trigger unless the enemy is committed to that route.  And you have to watch all three routes, not just the one you think is most likely.



So, whether Vietnam or our current mess, the question becomes "what indicators tell us what the enemy is doing?"   


Or to add another cliche:


Hope for the best, plan for the worst...


But don't assume the worst.


Friday, October 7, 2016

Raison d'Etat

Foreign policy experts, for the most part, focus on realism (though one person's realism is not the same as another).  There's a peculiar sort of logic to it, in that experts are not concerned with what is morally right or wrong...the only true test is whether or not you achieve your aims.  On behalf of your nation. 


I deliberately made that a little vague.  Most of those aims are, to be sure, to make your own nation strong and prosperous.  Or secure.  Or somesuch.  All are nicely covered by saying "achieve your aims".


That's part of why figures like Cardinal Richelieu and Otto von Bismarck are such complex and fascinating characters.  Not saints, no.  Yet masters of their time, and mostly in service to their state.  (For good or ill). 


It's hard to judge characters like this, as they are definitely not 'nice', or 'good', or necessarily people we should admire or want to follow.  They managed to do great things, though. 


I brought this up because if we're using Raison d'Etat, or realpolitik, or some other form of realism to determine our own policies than (using that logic) the only way to judge the decisions made is by their results.


It's a harsh method, one that allows no wiggle room for error.  Nor for good intentions.


And by that rubric, American policy in the last 60 or 70 years has not been all that great.


Yes, we saw the end of the Soviet Union.  Yes, we're a very powerful nation.  Our policies haven't been a complete disaster, though how much of that is because of our innate strengths I don't know.  We're a large country, with fairly secure borders (comparatively speaking), a well educated populace and a lot of resources.  We're also dealing with all sorts of turmoil and change.  Globalization, the Information Age, nationalism, multi-nationalist corporations, environmental change...there's been all sorts of challenges.  People have been doing the best they know how, and this isn't meant to point fingers and condemn anyone.


At the same time, can anyone look at Vietnam and say that the United States came out of it stronger?  Can anyone look at our history with Iran and think we're safer, or more secure? 


Can anyone look at the financial crisis, the recession, Syria, rising tensions in the South China sea, tensions with Russia and China (and the Philippines) and think we've been doing well?


Again, I'm not trying to call anyone in particular out.  It's just...


It's just that foreign policy, national security, and the Washington consensus has fads.  Just like businesses, and fashion, and just about everything else.  People aren't ever going to be thrown under the bus for being wrong, if everyone else was wrong too.  So even though 'nobody' saw the fall of the Soviet Union coming when it did (as one example) nobody was going to be penalized for that failure.  After all, everyone made the same mistake.


And nobody was going to be penalized for failing to predict the financial crisis, since hardly anybody credible saw it coming.


Again, this is hard to do.  Like predicting 9/11.  Once you know something happened you can go back and pick through the pieces, figure out which clues foreshadowed the event.  But figuring it out in real time?  Sorting out those pieces, putting them together with the other pieces, and figuring it out in time to actually act on it?


Very, very hard.


And something that's absolutely essential.

Tunnel Vision, and the Problems of Critiquing the Past

Before going into more recent history, I wanted to touch base on some very ancient history.  Namely, the Sicilian Expedition where Athens invaded Sicily during their war with Sparta.  Take a look at this map, from the Wikipedia article previously linked:





Seems kind of crazy that Athens and their allies (in red) would invade Sicily during their fight with Sparta and Sparta's allies (in blue). 


If you read the wikipedia article, you can see why it doesn't seem as crazy as it sounded at first.  There was some prior history, Sicily could aid their enemy, the Athenians had initial success, there were some odd circumstances that were probably not considered predictable (i.e. Nicias's attempt to stop it backfired and the invasion became so large that a defeat was more disastrous than it could have been; also the whole strange tale of Alcibiades.)


You can dig into the weeds, of course, and argue over what played the largest role in the disaster, whether disaster was truly inevitable, and more.  Yet if you pull back a little bit and look at the map, I think there are some obvious dangers. 


First of all, the distance is a problem.  Athens is farther away, which means there's an inevitable delay in sending supplies, communication, and response time.  I particularly want to point out how hard it is to ship horses for the cavalry.


Second, the resources sent to Sicily were not there to assist with allies closer by. (I kind of agree with Pericles, who wanted Athens to consolidate their allies closer to home.)  I think there's some truth to assessing the economics behind a war, though the connection is not always as clear as you'd think.  Anyways, triremes are expensive, and mounting an expedition like this used a lot of Athenian economic power.  Resources that could have been used elsewhere, to better effect.


There's something else that leaps out at me, though given how little Sparta knew about building a navy it doesn't seem relevant in this particular context.  Back then sailors generally hugged the coastline, as you can see by the red route on the map.  That means Athens is sailing past enemy territory for a large part of the journey.  If the Spartans did have more of a navy, they could have blockaded or interdicted the Athenians on any attempt to reach Sicily.  I suppose it's not always a bad idea.  The Allies hopscotched past islands in the Pacific during World War II, and it worked.  I just don't like the potential for an enemy to cut our supply lines, not unless it's a deliberate (and well thought out) strategy as in WWII.


I suppose of Sicily were some sort of key terrain, it might have justified the expedition.  But it really wasn't.  The level of support Sicily might have provided to Sparta was not worth the cost to Athens.


If you want to dig deeper into ancient history, there's plenty to look at.  I brought it up for two reasons.  The first is to point out how easy it is to know who was right and who was wrong when it's ancient history.  The truth, however, is that in the here and now it's always hard to know who to believe.  Who is most accurately assessing the situation.  There's always white noise, always information you have to filter out.  We can hear about the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades and wonder why Nicias didn't win at the time...


But if we were actually there at that point in time we probably would have believed Alcibiades instead.


The second reason?  Even a couple thousand years later we can argue over what did or didn't lead to failure.



Thursday, October 6, 2016

Life, the Universe, and Everything

I have a draft post I'm working on, discussing ways that our tunnel vision during the Cold War negatively impacted our foreign policy.  Yet I find myself writing about something else today, and that's partly because of this article.  My own experience was not all that traumatic.  And yet this particular section resonated with me:

"Nobody talks about the boredom, the impossibility of finding meaning in 8 hours work in an air-conditioned office after you just spent months working 18 hours a day on a battlefield where your touch altered history. Nobody talks about the surreal experience of trying to remember how you got excited about a book, or clothing, or even a car or house. On the battlefield, in the burning building, the ground trembled, we felt our impact in everything we did, until the world seemed to ripple at our touch. Back home, or off shift, we are suddenly the subject of sympathetic glances, of silly, repetitive questions. The anonymity of the uniform is nothing compared the anonymity of comfort. We drown in it, cut off from what makes it worthwhile for others, unable to carve out a piece of it for ourselves."

It resonated on a couple of different levels.  First, because of that potential job that fell through the other day.  I struggle in the civilian world.  Not to the degree that there's an obvious problem.  I've got a good paying job, I'm doing well enough.  It's just...well, the joy of learning new things distracted me for a while.  Made it easy to forget how unimportant our job really is.  Will it make that much of a difference whether something ships today or ships tomorrow?  Or (now that I manage the returns center), would it really make a difference if the customer gets their credit today vs. tomorrow?  I mean, sure...it shouldn't take three months.  But most of the time if a customer really needs their credit they'll contact customer care, who contacts me, and we pull their order out of the queue and process it right away.  The rest of it?  Not such a big deal.

These are the things I don't feel like I can say at work.  After all, I'm a supervisor.  I'm supposed to care about being better, faster, etc.  And I do...I get it.  It's just...nobody is going to die if we don't get it done.  Nobody is being shot at over what we're doing.

So I've been hoping to find a job that fills my need to make a difference, that ties in my own interests (amply found here on the blog) with some sort of need that pays enough to do it professionally.  Sure, I've got my hobby horse here on the blog...but it's not like I'm in a position to put my ideas into practice.  I'm more like an armchair quarterback.

This job had the potential to change that.  The potential to do something I'm interested in, that I find meaningful, and that I think I'd be pretty good at.  And...well, it ain't  happening.

On the one hand, nothing has changed.  I'm still exactly where I've been for the past four years.  And on the other hand...

On the other hand, I increasingly find myself stuck.  Unable to see the way forward, to see a path that matches my skillset to the type of job I want to do.

Tuesday, October 4, 2016

Counter-Terrorism, Oversimplification, Etc.

In college I took hapkido and tai chi.  Even a little bit of push hands.  It's been years since I've done any of it, but some of the lessons stuck with me still.

Push hands is a little bit like an old childhood game.  The one where you put your front foot next to someone else's foot, grab each other by the hand and try to unbalance the other person.  Except, of course, the stances and point of contact are different.

As for lessons learned - first of all, when you're in contact with the other person you can kind of sense where their balance is.  Where they're moving to, and from.  (In the military sense - when you're in contact with the enemy you have a sense of where they're moving to.  It's when you lose all contact that they become unpredictable.)

Second - in push hands, once someone loses balance the other person has control.  If your opponent loses their balance, you control where they go.  In order to win, you need to keep your balance while making them lose theirs.  If they're moving towards you, maybe you should go with it...even aid them in that movement.  Make them overextend.  Then they lose their balance, and you can direct them easily. 

So many people think battle is straightforward.  Attack.  Block.  Swing, block, swing.  A fight like that can easily become about brute strength, stamina, and speed.  It's comparatively simple...and makes you forget that there are other options.  Instead of blocking, just give them a little assist.  As they move farther and faster than they intended, they overextend and lose their balance.  Meeting strength with weakness can do the same thing.  (This is all situationally dependent, of course.)

So Vietnam, for example, could be seen as an overextension by the United States.  We lost our balance.  Funny enough, though, the Soviet Union then overextended in Afghanistan.

I brought this up for two reasons.  First because we all too often get locked into an 'attack/block' mentality.  It's important to remember that there are other options. 

The second reason?  We have to know when we're overextending. 

On a side note - when reading about the spy games during the Cold War it seemed that the Soviet Union regularly kicked our butts.  This may be a misleading impression, since I'm sure there are some things still classified...but the Soviets generally seemed to do better at building their spy networks.  Yet they're the ones that fell apart in the 80's...so apparently winning the spy game wasn't as critical as you'd think.

I'm part of that curious generation just old enough to remember the Cold War without being forged in it...and young enough to adapt to the internet and all the new technology that came out since then.  The logic of the Cold War was very black and white.  And during that time, we misread situations time and time again.  Focused more on communism, for example, and overlooked nationalism.  I believe our misreading the situation caused a lot of damage to our own national security. 

In the last decade or so terrorism has become the new thing...and I see some of the same mentalities.  Black vs. White.  Oversimplification of the issues.  When you see situations through that lens, you are just as likely to misread the situation and propose strategies that backfire.

This bothers me.  I think I hate terrorists as much as anyone, and I don't want them to succeed.  Yet I find, time and again, that the people who ought to be allies seem blindly determined to think in terms of attack/block...to the point where they actually make it harder to fight terrorism.